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The objective of this article is to sketch an historical analysis of the change in the philosophy of science that took place in the 1950s and 1960s around the time of the publication of Structure by Thomas Kuhn.  I offer an alternative to the revisionist interpretation that this change is marked by ignorance or neglect, on the part of Kuhn and others, of logical positivism in its more mature form, in this way serving the revolutionary strategy.  Countering this conception, I present good reasons for the philosophy of science community, in that historical context, to have used the logical positivist project as their reference and target of criticism rather than the later work of Carnap.  I suggest that, faced with the original version of the project, the critics saw Carnap’s “liberalizations” as degenerative.  I hold that the revisionists, in turn, neglected the historical context surrounding the philosophical change in question, and touched up the image of positivism from a contemporary perspective.  
  
1. Introduction
In a previous article, I tried to offer a more nuanced alternative to Reisch’s interpretation, and that of other revisionists, to the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the International Encyclopedia of the Unified Science.​[1]​  I concluded the article saying that, once Kuhn’s work had been published, the rest was history.  At the time, I was obviously referring to the change in the philosophy of science that then followed.  Here I propose to sketch an historical analysis of this change which, despite being generally acknowledged, nevertheless inspires very dissonant interpretations.  I will restrict myself to a criticism of the revisionist conception and attempt to provide an alternative. 
A growing consensus has formed regarding the revisionism of the work of Carnap, as John Preston has observed.  This consensus can be immediately verified, for example, in two recent Cambridge Companions, “to Carnap” and “to Logical Empiricism”, edited and written by revisionists.  What I intend to do here is broaden the reach of the “dissenting voice” that Preston attributes to me, adding to it a new justification (Preston 2008, p. 110).
The revisionists defend the thesis of compatibility between Kuhn and the “last” Carnap, and according to them (“not at all surprisingly”) Kuhn and his fellows neglected or perhaps even turned a blind eye to the philosophical evolution of Carnap.  They hold that this expediency, as well as Kuhn’s ‘heroic’ lack of consideration of Carnap’s letters in praise of Structure, formed part of a philosophical marketing strategy or the revolutionary rhetoric of postpositivism.​[2]​  The supposed postpositivist revolutionaries, they argue, behaved only in conformity with their “philosophical agenda”, as the protagonists of scientific revolutions and even of political revolutions.  To illustrate, one need only observe how two prestigious revisionists, Michael Friedman and John Earman introduce their respective articles:
Since its “official demise”, writes Friedman,
it has naturally been customary to view logical positivism as a kind of philosophical bogeyman whose faults and failings need to be enumerated (or, less commonly, investigated) before one’s favored “new” approach to philosophy can properly begin. And such an attitude toward logical positivism and its demise has been widely prevalent, not only in the narrower community of philosophers of science (who have characteristically proceeded against the back​ground of Thomas Kuhn’s well-known critique), but also in the broader philosophical community as well. With our increasing his​torical distance from logical positivism, however, a more dispassion​ate attitude has also inevitably begun to emerge. No longer threat​ened or challenged by logical positivism as a live philosophical op​tion, it is becoming increasingly possible to consider this movement as simply a part of the history of philosophy which, as such, can be investigated impartially from a historical point of view. Indeed, we have seen in recent years a veritable flowering of historically ori​ented reconsiderations of logical positivism (Friedman 1999, p. 1).
 And Friedman continues: 
In the course of these reconsiderations it has become clear  not at all surprisingly, of course  that the above-mentioned postpositivist reaction gave birth to a large number of seriously misleading ideas about the origins, motivations, and true philosophical aims of the positivist movement. (One can hardly expect philosophical critics, concerned largely with their own agendas rather than with historical fidelity, to generate anything other then stereotypes and misconceptions) (Friedman 1999, p. 2).
Earman, in turn, writes: 
For the past two decades logical positivism has served as a whipping boy. By emphasizing the shortcomings of this failed philosophical program, the virtues of the new postpositivist philosophy of science are made to seem more lustrous. It is, of course, not surprising to find such polemical devices employed, since they are common to the rhetoric of revolutions, whether political, scientific, or philosophical. Or so the standard assessment would go. What I find askew in this assessment is the notion that a philosophical revolution as opposed to an evolution has taken place. For although I am no apologist for logical positivism, it does seem to me that many of the themes of the so-called postpositivist philosophy of science are extensions of ideas found in the writings of Carnap and other leading logical positivists and logical empiricists (Earman 1993, p. 9). 
Another well-known revisionist, Thomas Uebel, speaks of the “simple-minded portrayals” made today of members of the Vienna Circle, and the “potted histories” used by many writers to preface their ‘new’ work (Cf. Uebel 1996, p.416).
In this context, revisionism thus represents an effort to recover the true image of logical positivism and undo philosophical “popular wisdom” (Cf. Reisch 1991, p. 264) or a “popular myth” among philosophers:  the belief that “postpositivist philosophy of science represents a revolutionary departure from its archrival positivism, at least in the context of Carnap’s and Kuhn’s works” (Irzik & Grunberg 1995, pp. 285 and 304). 
The point of this article is obviously not to deny the existence of aspects that may be considered “external” in a philosophical change, but rather to offer a more adequate and nuanced alternative to the revisionist interpretation based on an historical perspective.  The revisionist conception of the philosophical change that we consider here is a direct consequence of the claim of compatibility between the work of Kuhn and Carnap; more specifically, between Kuhn’s Structure and “Carnap’s mature philosophy” (Cf. Irzik & Grunberg 1995, p.293), when the latter was allegedly ignored or overlooked by those involved in the historical context in which the choice was made.  It then becomes necessary to explain why this happened, as it is not behavior one would expect of rational historical agents, particularly philosophers concerned with knowledge and the very question of rationality.  The initial explanations of the revisionists do not go beyond the description outlined above, although Irzik and Grunberg do suggest a sociological approach.  In the last lines of their article, they write:
Our paper also raises two obvious questions, especially for the sociologist: why has the logical positivist movement been misunderstood so badly? And, what were the reasons for its decline? Answering these questions and establishing more adequately the conclusions suggested seem to us to be projects worth pursuing (Irzik & Grunberg 1995, p.305).
Until now, to the best of my knowledge, neither these authors nor any of the revisionists (including Alan Richardson, who in his recent article for The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism also showed interest in the subject) have yet developed empirical research on this theme.​[3]​  Allow me, then, to outline some considerations with respect to the philosophical change, specifically concerning the Carnap-Kuhn relation, at the same level of speculation as the revisionists.  My intention is to demonstrate the existence of a more adequate alternative for understanding this question, as opposed to the interpretation offered by the revisionists that logical positivism was misunderstood or neglected by historical agents, leading to a mistaken belief in the revolutionary nature of Kuhn’s work.
In what follows, I present good reasons for the philosophy of science community, in their own historical context, to have used the logical positivist project as their reference and target of criticism, rather than the so-called “mature philosophy” of Carnap.  I hold that, faced with the original version of the project, which is clear, objective, and radical, the critics saw the “liberalizations” as degenerative.  I attempt to show that the revisionists overlooked the historical context surrounding the question of choice and the philosophical change, inadvertently touching up the image of positivism based on a contemporary perspective.  This perspective is, naturally, post-Kuhnian, with serious consequences, which I seek to draw in the final section. 

2. Positivism and depositivism 
I would begin by saying that I find the “Kuhnian” character created by the revisionists especially for Carnap – whether as an author compatible with Kuhn or a precursor of  Kuhn – less convincing or credible than the role of protagonist in a Kuhnian crisis of change would be.  However, what I am interested in emphasizing here is not the supposed Kuhnian aspect of the crisis of logical positivism but the possibility that Carnap’s work was understood at that historical moment, and in a most rational manner, as a degenerating research project (to use, with no obligation, Lakatos’ expression).  
Kuhn himself, perhaps embarrassed by the revisionists’ suspicions regarding his originality, is quite frank and revealing when he said that he “was almost totally innocent of the post-Aufbau Carnap” (Cf. Horwich 1993, p.313).  In other words, we can suppose that, at some point, following the criticisms, self-criticisms, and changes that the movement experienced, Kuhn lost interest in logical positivism.  This can be understood as a deliberate, critical attitude in the face of the original logical positivist project, and I believe it can be generalized to understand what took place in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Regarding Kuhn, this can be observed in the concern he expresses about the publication of Structure in Encyclopedia and the contrast between the period when it was commissioned and accepted and the moment it was about to be published.  Kuhn writes: 
I hoped it [the book] was important. I had wanted to do this, I was not altogether satisfied, but I was pretty excited about it. I didn't know how it was going to go over. I began to have vast reservations about putting it in the Encyclopedia of Unified Science, because the encyclopedia had been an exciting thing fifteen years before, but its reputation had declined considerably, and it was no longer in the forefront. But I had a commitment (Kuhn 2000, p. 300).   
The same loss of interest also seems to have occurred among his more intimate enemies, the metaphysicians, who no longer had much to be bothered about in the face of the theoretical repairs and consequent debilitation of logical positivism and the strength of his criticism. The following comment by Popper is illustrative:  “The original proposal of verifiability as the criterion of meaning was at least clear, simple, and forceful. The modifications and shifts which were now introduced were the very opposite” (Popper 1969 [1953], p.41).  Also this comment, which Carnap says he heard from Einstein at Princeton, sometime between 1952 and 1954:  “...if positivism were now liberalized to such an extent, there would no longer be any difference” between this theory and “any other philosophical view” (Cf. Schilpp 1963, p 38).
An Einstein’s letter published by Don Howard sheds light in this aspect. Howard writes: 
Over the years, Einstein grew ever more impatient with the failure of Schlick, Reichenbach, Carnap, and their allies to understand his reservations about their view of the structure of theories and the re​lation between theory and evidence. His summary opinion was stated clearly, and with acid sarcasm, in a letter to Paul Schilpp of 19 May 1953, declining Schilpp's invitation to contribute a paper to the Carnap volume of the Library of Living Philosophers:
It is a good idea to devote a volume of your collection to Carnap's life's work. But I cannot comply with your request. That is to say, I have come to terms with this slippery material from time to time only when my own problems made it urgently necessary. But even then I have studied only a little literature, so that I cannot do justice to the swarm of incessantly twittering positivistic little birds.... Between you and me, I think that the old positivistic horse, which originally appeared so fresh and frisky, has become a pitiful skeleton following the refinements that it has perforce gone through, and that it has dedicated itself to a rather arid hair-splitting. In its youthful days it nourished itself on the weaknesses of its opponents. Now it has grown respectable and is in the difficult position of having to prolong its existence under its own power, poor thing (Howard 1990, pp. 373-374).
And even Carnap himself revealed: 
Although we abandoned the principle of verifiability, we did not yet see clearly what criterion of significance should take its place. But I recognized at least the general direction in which we have to move”. And also: “The development towards a more liberal criterion of significance took a number of years…” (Schilpp 1963, p. 58).
It is worth keeping in mind that Carnap worked until the end of his life on his project of an inductive logic, seeking to establish degrees of confirmability for scientific statements.  Feigl refers to this long period in a note (originally not intended for publication) in Feigl 1963​[4]​: 
It has been with a sense of triumphant vindication that I observed during the last three decades Carnap's successive steps toward the abandonment of the reductionist phases, first of phenomenalism, and later of his reductive physicalism and logical behav​iorism. Ayer's book The Problem of Knowledge manifests a similar transition  and quite a reform this is!  an epistemology practically tantamount to that of critical realism. Hence, far from feeling like a repentant sinner, I could say to my erstwhile posi​tivistic friends 'I had told you so' already way back in the heyday of the Vienna Circle (Feigl 1983, p. 39).
To understand the dissatisfaction reigning at the time, I believe one should not lose sight of some declarations of intent made by members of logical positivism, such as Reichenbach, who wrote in 1938: 
It was the intention of modern positivism to restore knowledge to absolute
certainty; what was proposed with the formalistic interpretation of logic
was nothing other than a resumption of the program of Descartes.(…) It is the in​eradicable desire of absolutely certain knowledge which stands behind both the rationalism of Descartes and the logicism of positivists (Reichenbach 1938, pp.  344-345). 
This description of the original project of logical positivism seems to have the approval of Carnap himself.  In a well-known passage in his intellectual autobiography, he writes:
Under the influence of some philosophers, especially Mach and Russell, I regarded in the Logischer Aufbau a phenomenalistic language as the best for a philosophical analysis of knowledge. I believed that the task of philosophy consists in reducing all knowledge to a basis of certainty. Since the most certain knowledge is that of the immediately given, whereas knowledge of material things is derivative and less certain, it seemed that the philosopher must employ a language which uses sense-data as a basis (Schilpp 1963, p.50). 
And further on: 
According to the original conception, the system of knowledge, although growing constantly more comprehensive, was regarded as closed system in the following sense. We assumed that there was a certain rock bottom of knowledge, the knowledge of immediately given, which was indubitable. Every other kind of knowledge was supposed to be firmly supported by this basis and therefore likewise decidable with certainty. This was the picture which I had given in the Logischer Aufbau  (Schilpp 1963, p.57).
Michael Friedman says that Carnap only referred to his project in this way in retrospect (Cf. Friedman 1999, p. 145).  This is very debatable​[5]​, but regardless, I believe that one cannot neglect the fact that, in the end, the retrospective statement reveals Carnap’s perspective on the subject at the moment the observation was made, and perhaps since the 1950s. Now, if this is Carnap’s perspective on the project of logical positivism, even if only in retrospect, historical agents cannot be blamed for thinking the same at that same moment. 
Kuhn, for example, writes about that moment: 
Like my fellow innovators I was primarily motivated by widely recognized difficulties in the then current philoso​phy of science, most prominently in positivism or logical empiricism but in other sorts of empiricism as well. (…) All of us had been brought up to believe, more or less strictly, in one or another version of a traditional set of beliefs about which I'll briefly and schematically remind you. Science proceeds from facts given by observation. Those facts are objective in the sense that they are interpersonal: they are, it was said, accessible to and indubitable for all normally equipped human observers. They had to be discovered, of course, before they could become data for science, and their discovery often required the invention of elaborate new instruments. But the need to search out the facts of observation was not seen as a threat to their authority once they were found. Their status as the objective starting point, available to all, remained secure. These facts, the older image of science continued, are prior to the scientific laws and theories for which they provide the foundation, and which are themselves, in turn, the basis for explanations of natural phenomena (Kuhn 2000, pp. 106-107).​[6]​
In addition, even given the revisionists’ exaggerated emphasis on Carnap’s “principle of tolerance”, one can also not lose sight of the ambition and the virtual ‘principle of intolerance’ that was already associated with the logical positivist project.  In fact, this “proud philosophical movement” (Cf. Haller 1982, p. 25) boasted of their supposedly extraordinary deeds and demonstrated true intolerance of other philosophical movements.  As Carnap wrote in “The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language” (1932), following the laudable but vain historical attempts to eradicate metaphysics for being “false”, “uncertain” or “sterile”, logical positivism brought about its "radical elimination", showing that it was  "entirely meaningless" (Ayer 1959, pp. 60-61). 
Or, as he says in “The old and the new logic” (1930-1931), with the implacable instrument of the new logic, positivism mortally wounded, in a single blow, the metaphysics of Plato, St. Thomas, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel (Cf. Ayer 1959, p. 134).  In the same spirit, Schlick wrote in 1932 that the difficulty of realizing that metaphysics is meaningless “is the real cause of all the troubles from which philosophical speculation has been suffering for about twenty-five centuries” (Schlick 1979, p. 362).
To this can be added Carnap’s postscript notes to “The Physical Language as the Universal Language of Science” (1934):
In the first place I want to emphasize that we are not a philosophical school and that we put forward no philosophical theses whatsoever. To this the following objection will be made: You reject all philosophical schools hitherto, because you fancy your opinions are quite new; but every school shares this illusion, and you are no exception. No, there is this essen​tial difference must be the answer (…) we give no answer to philosophical questions, and instead reject all philosophical questions, whether of metaphysics, ethics or epistemology. (…) Originally, philosophy included mathematics and also, until recently, the sciences of sociology and psychology. At the present time, these studies have been separated from sociology and psychology in order to constitute independent branches of science. Both general logic and the logic of science (…) must be separated from philosophy, in the same fashion, in order to be pursued according to an exact, non-philosophic, and scientific method. Logic is the last scientific ingredient of philosophy; its extraction leaves behind only a confusion of non-scientific, pseudo problems (Carnap 1934, pp. 394-395).  
And to conclude our brief anthology of positivist ambition or presumption, here is a comparison of the thesis of physicalism with some of the most important achievements in the history of ideas.  Carnap writes:
Let us permit ourselves a brief remark  apart from principal point  concerning the emotional resistance to the thesis of physicalism. Such resistance is always exerted against any thesis when an Idol is being dethroned by it, when we are asked to discard an idea with which dignity and grandeur are associated. As a result of Copernicus' work, man lost the distinction of a central position in the universe; as a result of Darwin's, he was deprived of the dignity of a special supra-animal existence; as a result of Marx's, the factors by means of which history can be causally explained were degraded from the realm of ideas to that of material events; as a result of Nietzsche’s the origins of morals were stripped of their halo; as a result of Freud’s, the factors by means of which the idea and actions of men can be causally explained were located in the darkest depths, in man’s nether regions. (…) Now it is proposed that psychology, which has hitherto been robed in majesty as the theory of spiritual events, be degraded to the status of a part of physics (Ayer 1959, pp. 167-168).
These texts, some of which were translated in Ayer’s 1959 collection, were written in German in the 1930s and are well-known.​[7]​  From that point on, logical positivism – which would present itself as a proud philosophical (or anti-philosophical) movement, and whose typical member would be, in Feigl’s words, “a philosophical prohibitionist” (Cf. Feigl 1983, p. 38) – finds itself obligated to follow a virtual self-critical via crucis.  But the change in attitude that followed did not imply a complete renunciation of its theoretical points nor did it compose a body of theory that could be understood as a new project.  While some theses were abandoned or weakened​[8]​, others appeared to preserve themselves, with or without qualifications.  This is what can be concluded from the texts written by Carnap especially for Ayer’s volume as addenda to the articles published therein.  As he writes, for example, in “Remarks by the author (1957)” to “The Old and the new logic”:
The position explained in sections 8 and 9 of the foregoing paper was modified in the years following its publication in the following respect. The reduction of scientific concepts to the concepts of either of the two bases indicated (viz., to the given, i.e., sense-data, or to observable prop​erties of physical things) cannot generally be carried out in the form of explicit definitions. Therefore scientific sentences are in general not translatable into sentences of either of the two bases; the relation between them is more complicated. Consequently a scientific sentence is not simply decidable as true or as false; it can only be more or less confirmed on the basis of given observations. Thus the earlier principle of verifia​bility, first pronounced by Wittgenstein, was replaced by the weaker requirement of confirmability. The thesis of the unity of science re​mained, however, intact in virtue of the common basis of confirmation for all branches of empirical science (Ayer 1959, p. 146).
The same occurs in his preface written in 1961 to the English edition of Aufbau:
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt was my first larger book, the first attempt to bring into systematic form my earlier philosophical reflections. The first version was written in the years 1922-1925. When I read the old formulations today, I find many a passage which I would now phrase differently or leave out altogether; but I still agree with the philosophical orientation which stands behind this book. This holds especially for the problems that are posed, and for the essential features of the method which was employed. The main problem concerns the possibility of the rational reconstruction of the concepts of all fields of knowledge on the basis of concepts that refer to the immediately given. By rational reconstruction is here meant the searching out of new definitions for old concepts. The old concepts did not ordinarily originate by way of deliberate formulation, but in more or less unreflected and spontaneous development. The new definitions should be superior to the old in clarity and exactness, and, above all, should fit into a systematic structure of concepts. Such a clarification of concepts, nowadays frequently called "explication," still seems to me one of the most important tasks of philosophy, especially if it is concerned with the main categories of human thought (Carnap 1961, p. v).     
Thus, if, as I have argued, the original project seemed degenerated or failed from the point of view of historical agents, no other was yet available to replace it.  Carnap would no longer be considered a logical positivist, but he was also not really a so-called postpositivist.  Maybe he was a kind of depositivist; or, in the words of John Wisdom, logical positivism was going through a process of “depositivisation”: 
It may be flogging a dead horse to question further the verifiability theory of meaning, because there are no longer any logical positivists. I will take this risk because, although I do not believe in the reincarnation of souls, I am not so sure when it comes to the re-incarnation of the spirit of dead horses. Depositivisation has, of course, changed things a little, but when a reform has been adopted, especially tacitly, the status quo is often reestablished, albeit in a manner in which it is not always or not easily recognised. I will therefore also raise the question whether a certain more modern doctrine is not, perhaps, a re-incarnation, with a new look, of the principle of verifiability (Wisdom 1963, p. 335)
Quine’s description in Epistemology naturalized fits this picture well.  It points to the disfiguration of the logical positivist project and the lack of a justification to continue to maintain it with little more than a declaration of intentions:
To relax the demand for definition, and settle for a kind of reduction that does not eliminate, is to renounce the last re​maining advantage that we supposed rational reconstruction to have over straight psychology; namely, the advantage of trans​lational reduction. If all we hope for is a reconstruction that links science to experience in explicit ways short of translation, then it would seem more sensible to settle for psychology. Better to discover how science is in fact developed and learned than to fabricate a fictitious structure to a similar effect (Quine 1969, p. 78).
Already in 1960, Quine made the classic reference to “Neurath’s boat”. He said that  “Neurath has likened science to a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by plank while staying afloat in it” (Cf. Quine 1960, p. 3).  According to Quine, one could say that “Carnap’s boat”, like Neurath’s, was being rebuilt at high sea, but unlike Neurath’s, it was still wandering in search of dry land.  Anyway, for him, Carnap and Neurath were not in the same boat.
The revisionists naturally criticize Quine’s interpretation, considering him to be yet another who misunderstood Carnap.  But I cite him deliberately here because he is one of the protagonists in the philosophical change that we study; one of the historical actors in the change.  In truth, Quine endorses an opposition that Hempel himself pointed out in the Vienna Circle between Schlick and Carnap’s research program with its normative nature, on the one hand, and the more descriptive focus of Neurath, on the other.  According to Hempel, in fact, “the latter program was not attacked by the critics of positivism and is as alive now as it was before” (Cf. Hoyningen-Huene 1992b, pp. 89-94).  In other words, according to Quine and Hempel, there are two different boats both flying the flag of empiricism, but with very different coordinates; as we could say, one “empiricism at sea” and one “empiricism at bay” (Cf. McMullin 1974 and Feigl 1974).
Thus, the reference to the original logical positivist project or the emphasis on the “deficiencies of this failed philosophical program” (Cf. Earman, p. 9) would not be part of the advertising or propaganda campaign aimed at promoting postpositivism. It would be rather a genuine, critical attitude of someone who finally has a new project to offer for the philosophy of science – new and alternative in relation to the only project then available, albeit discredited, the logical positivist project. As Kuhn writes:
Variously construed, these processes constituted something called the scientific method. Sometimes thought to have been invented in the sev​enteenth century, this was the method by which scientists discovered true generalizations about and explanations for natural phenomena. Or if not exactly true, at least approximations to the truth. And if not certain approximations, then at least highly probable ones. Something of this sort we had all been taught, and we all knew that attempts to refine that understanding of scientific method and what it produced had en​countered deep, though isolated, difficulties that were not, after centu​ries of effort, responding to treatment. It was those difficulties which drove us to observations of scientific life and to history, and we were considerably disconcerted by what we found there (Kuhn 2000, p. 107).
And Kuhn comments on “the new approach” that, according to him, has “fundamentally altered the received image of science”:
As many of you know, the image of science current both inside and, less completely, outside the academy has, during the last quarter century, been quite radically transformed. I was myself a con​tributor to that transformation, think it was badly needed, and have few significant regrets. The change has, I think, begun to yield a far more realistic understanding of what the scientific enterprise is, how it oper​ates, and what it can and cannot achieve than was available before (Kuhn 2000, pp. 105-106).

The new project was perceived as such also by Hempel, even with considerable reluctance at first. He tells us, in an interview from 1982-1983, of his initial resistance to Kuhn’s ideas:
I met Thomas Kuhn at the Center [Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, in Stanford] for the first time. He was not a fellow at the Center that year but was teaching at Berkeley. We met several times for discussions and I was very much struck by his ideas. At first I found them strange and I had very great resistance to these ideas, his historicist, pragmatist approach to problems in the methodology of science, but I have changed my mind con​siderably about this since then. In fact a good deal of the thinking and writing I did subsequently was in one way or another influenced by the problems and issues that have been raised by Kuhn's writings (Fetzer 2000, pp 23-24).
Here one might ask: Does Hempel’s initial resistance in relation to Kuhn’s ideas mean that he also misunderstands Carnap?  After all, he should not, in principle, found them strange, since according to the revisionists, he would already be familiar with these ideas from Carnap’s work.  It also seems strange that Hempel, whose early mentor was Carnap, and who was later widely influenced by Kuhn, does not refer to the supposedly strong philosophical relations between the two authors.  It is notable, however, that Hempel, at the same time, is so emphatic in pointing out the similarities between Kuhn and Neurath.  He writes, for example, that “with respect to their pragmatic-sociological orientation, the ideas of Neurath share a clear affinity with the ideas of Kuhn” (Hempel 2000, p.194). 
Hempel, nevertheless, does not appear to delude himself regarding this affinity.  He criticizes the programmatic character of Neurath’s conceptions and leaves room for the idea that Neurath was valued as a contributor, and not only a promoter, of the logical positivist movement following the emergence of Kuhn’s work (Cf. Hempel 2000, pp. 194, 260 and 300).​[9]​  This is consistent with the fact that, even with Neurath’s ideas as background, Hempel found Kuhn’s proposal strange and was initially resistant to it.


3. Revisionism and a touched-up image of positivism
In the above account of the reasons for the criticism of the “original conception” of logical positivism (Cf. Carnap’s expression in Schilpp 1963, p. 57, cited above), I seek to show that the evolution of logical positivism of which the revisionists speak was not yet available as such to the historical actors involved in the change.  As we saw, they had good reasons to perceive the supposed evolution instead as an involution or degeneration.  Thus, it would not have been necessary to explain why logical positivism had been “so badly” misunderstood by the postpositivists, as the revisionists claim, because, within that historical context, it was not badly misunderstood.  As I see it, what remains to be explained is why, as we could say, the revisionists understand logical positivism ‘so well’.
	Historically, the postpositivists criticize the original logical positivist project.  There was no alternative to logical positivism, and a new project only materialized precisely with the proposals of Popper, Kuhn, and other postpositivist critics, as a really new project, consciously presented and conceived as such.  This took years and demanded considerable work.  Much time went by before Kuhn’s proposal emerged, if we take it as a reference here; much time to become a proposal and still more time before it was accepted.  In fact, I believe that this is why the revisionist interpretation, if we take it as an object of historical consideration as well, only presented itself beginning in the 1990s.  
	Of course, this has all yet to be investigated.  But my fear is that, because they can and do avail themselves of the postpositivist perspective, the revisionists will understand, in retrospect, Carnap’s movements not as decharacterizations of the old positivist project, but as characterizations of the new postpositivist project.  From this perspective, a few unsteady steps outside positivism can be seen nowadays as firm steps on the path to so-called postpositivism.
Consistent with their thesis of affinity between the work of Kuhn and the mature Carnap, the revisionists overvalue Carnap’s later work and neglect the original project.  Thus, they understand the historical change in contemporary philosophy of science as a mistake - at least its breadth and magnitude which, as Earman said, they tend to see as an evolution rather than a revolution intended by the postpositivists.  This mistake is seen as being a consequence of the incorrect reading of Carnap on the part of the postpositivists, his supposed adversaries.   As we saw, they seek to explain this misreading as being due to ignorance, neglect, and even malicious intent, insinuating that it served the interests of the philosophy of science ‘revolutionaries’.  
Richardson, in his recent article in the Cambridge companion to logical empiricism, does not criticize his fellow revisionists, but he avoids raising their suspicions. Nevertheless, Richardson’s conception of the philosophical change induced by Kuhn is, like the other revisionists cited above, that it was an historical mistake.  Thus, like the other revisionists, Richardson fails to take seriously the reference of Kuhn and others to the original conception of logical positivism, a precise indicator of what was historically relevant at that time from the perspective of the historical agents.  He is more concerned about defining how logical positivism should have been understood and how the history should have taken place (a ‘normative history’); and, like other revisionists, he tries to explain the deviation from the norm through a sociological or an empirical approach. ​[10]​
 Andersen, Barker, and Chen call this type of approach “philosophical reconstruction of history” and describe it in opposition to David Bloor’s so-called “requirement of symmetry”:
This requirement counts against philosophical reconstructions of history, like those of Lakatos and Laudan, that invoke one pattern of explanation (nonempirical, rational argument) do explain histor​ical events that conform to a prescribed standard of rationality and another pattern (empirical causes, including psychological and soci​ological causes) to explain everything else. The former usually corre​spond to scientific beliefs held true today and their obvious historical antecedents ("The earth is a planet"). The latter usually correspond to beliefs held false today and perhaps not deemed scientific ("The position of the planets when someone is born influences that person's character"). (…) In general historical work, true and false beliefs are regarded as equally amenable to historical explanation. The rejection of the sym​metry principle in some historically oriented philosophy of science is a major divergence from accepted standards of good historical expla​nation (Andersen 2006, pp. 176-177).
	Hoyningen-Huene, commenting on the mistaken image of science that is produced in the history of science according to Kuhn, briefly describes the process:
In summary, this deceptive image originates through an assimilation of past science to present science by the older historiographic tradition, and this happens mainly in two ways. First, the selection of what will be part of the historical narrative is guided by the content of present science: only those elements of past science that are parts of present science are seen as historically valuable. Second, what is historically valuable (by the said criterion) is represented by means of the concepts of present science which may lead to serious distortion of older knowledge. In short: the older historiography of science does not allow for the possible strangeness and oddness of the older science, for its being substantially different from today's science (Hoyningen-Huene 1992a, p. 489. See also Kuhn 1970, pp. 137-138).
This is the case of the relation between Einsteinian and Newtonian dynamics, which Kuhn discusses in Structure (Kuhn 1970, pp. 98-103). What is of interest to us here stands out clearly in the following passage from Bernstein, which includes a quote from Structure:
We must not misinterpret Kuhn’s claim. He is fully aware that it is certainly possible to reconstruct or transform "Newton's laws" so that we can derive an approximation of these laws from Einstei​nian mechanics. But this is precisely the point: it is just an approxi​mation that is derived, and one that is not, strictly speaking, identi​cal with Newton's laws. It is only because we can give a translation and a transformation from the perspective of Einstein that we are enabled now to speak of a transformed Newtonian theory as a special case of Einsteinian theory. "Though an out-of-date theory can always be viewed as a special case of its up-to-date successor, it must be transformed for the purpose. And, the transformation is one that can be undertaken only with the advantages of hindsight, the explicit guidance of the more recent theory" (pp. 102-3). From Kuhn's perspective, the perspicuous way of putting the positivist's point about derivability is that one powerful reason for accepting a succes​sor theory or paradigm over its rival is that it can explain what is "true" and "false" in the replaced theory; it has a richer content and at the same time can account for what is still taken as valid in the earlier theory, a transformation that becomes possible only because of the new theory (Bernstein 1983, pp. 83-84).
Thus I believe it is possible to think in terms of a touched-up image of positivism offered by the revisionists.  The depositivism to which I referred in the preceding section obviously does not correspond to a project.  It appears as a negative process, a deconstruction or disfiguration.  Quine associates Carnap’s later work with “make-believe” or a “fictitious history” (pp. 75 and 77), work that continues to be logical positivist by intent only.  But it is of this positivism that the revisionists speak.  Readers of the recent Cambridge companions to Carnap and to logical empiricism have practically no news of that dogmatic and aggressive movement to which I briefly referred above.  They are, in fact, companions to light Carnap and to light logical empiricism.​[11]​ George Reisch, in his article in the latter collection, does go so far as to speak in terms of a crisis, but he also fails to report any intolerance on the part of the logical positivists.  He tells of the absurd political intolerance of which the logical positivists were victims on the USA, but not of their own prior theoretical intolerance (Cf. Reisch 2007).
This cannot be confused with a more nuanced view nor understood merely as a way to counterbalance the “damaging effects” of a traditional reading of logical positivism.  It is not exactly an innocent and polished effort on the part of the revisionists to spare us the work of reading once more well-known texts.  Those of us who are familiar with these texts are, in fact, spared a boring repetition, but others are being introduced to a touched-up image of logical positivism that is more in line with the revisionist thesis.  And the two Cambridge Companions about logical positivism inadvertently assume, for the philosophy of science, the role of scientific textbooks, in Kuhn’s sense.  If anyone has the impression that the process of re-writing history is a naïve or rough process, they have only to examine the case of the revisionism of logical positivism to understand the sophistication of the process of forming a consensus or a new orthodoxy in the philosophy of science. 
But as Hanfling said, beyond the doctrines themselves, the intolerance and “the aggressive and even arrogant way in which those doctrines were propounded to the world” certainly contributed to the strong rejection of logical positivism (Hanfling 1996, p. 193).  The reconsiderations or retractions of a philosophical movement that were responsible for a genuine metaphysical witch hunt, with an index verborum prohibitorum applied externally as well as internally​[12]​, could not expect a sympathetic or charitable reception.  It was a project with inquisitional tendencies and manifestations that had, naturally, as its basis, an absolutist theory of knowledge, “a philosophy to end all philosophies” (a parody of ‘a war to end all wars’, the First World War... Cf. Feigl 1983, p. 38).  
It is thus particularly curious to observe the revisionists’ efforts to explain the rise of postpositivism virtually without the historical backdrop of the logical positivists’ absolutism. And it is also interesting to note that revisionists present and justify themselves as being able to maintain enough historical distance to allow a balanced view of logical positivism (Cf. Friedman 2007, pp. 2-3 and Friedman 1999, p. 1, the latter already quoted). 
 My proposal is not to deny this disposition in spirit of the revisionists.  What I wish to emphasize here is the fact that they also have a parti pris, a philosophical agenda to fulfill.  They criticize historical agents for having neglected the subtleties of logical positivism in its mature phase while they themselves turn a blind eye to the radical positions and intolerance present in the “original conception” of logical positivism.  This is what can be observed in the revisionists’ reticent references to these inconvenient episodes and the brief explanations they offered for them.
This is the case of Richardson’s approach, as can immediately be shown by evoking the question he raises at the end of his article in the Companion to Carnap:  “One question remains:  if Carnap's philosophy stresses tolerance, open-mindedness, and ‘an experimental spirit’, how is it that he has acquired the reputation as a hard-liner and dogmatist?” (Richardson 2007b, p 313).  To which he summarily responds by exempting Carnap from all responsibility. ​[13]​

4. Final considerations
I would summarize my criticism of the way the revisionists see the relation between Carnap and Kuhn, with respect to the philosophical change, as follows:
Even if Carnap’s “last” work could be seen as compatible with Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, I believe the reception of the latter as a revolutionary work would have been fully justified at that historical moment. It thus becomes unnecessary to explain – sociologically or historically – why logical positivism was “so badly” interpreted, as it in fact was not, at that historical moment and in those circumstances.  Rather, it becomes necessary or useful to strive to understand, as I have done here, why the revisionists interpret Carnap and logical positivism ‘so well’.
Revisionists’ accusation that Carnap’s work was misunderstood by historical actors involved in the proposal and acceptance of the so-called postpositivist project derives from the fact that the revisionists avail themselves of an historical perspective which differs significantly from that of the historical actors. That which the revisionists see now, from a perspective that is already postpositivist, as an approximation of Carnap to postpositivism, is what historical actors, without access to this perspective, had very good reasons to consider as degeneration of the positivist project.  
As we have seen, revisionists point out that logical positivism “has served as a whipping boy” or “a kind of philosophical bogeyman whose faults and failings need to be enumerated (or, less commonly, investigated) before one’s favored ‘new’ approach to philosophy can properly begin” (Cf. Earman 1993, p. 9 and Friedman 1991, p.505). They think that, despite broad acknowledgment of the failure or death of logical positivism, the movement, as a mythological figure, appears to be condemned to always being exhumed for yet another exemplary beating.  This perversity was already denounced in the 1950s.  In a review of Joad’s criticism of logical positivism, and using the same expression as Earman, Ernest Hutten wrote that in twenty years, logical positivism had gone “from enfant terrible to whipping boy”. 
What I have sought to criticize here is the explanation that revisionists today, as well as Hutten in the 1950s, furnish for the fact.  To avoid repeating the passages of revisionists quoted above, let’s look at what Hutten had to say:   
No one quite knows what is meant by ‘Logical Positivism’; but everybody is against it. This makes the philosopher's game more amusing since he can so set up a scarecrow as adversary and knock it down again to display his prowess (Hutten 1951, p. 172). 
I find it strange that another less extravagant, albeit less imaginative, explanation has not emerged.  What I have sought to show is that the logical positivist project is criticized in its original form because it is historically the ‘received view’, the ‘paradigm’ that was available in the philosophy of science at the end of the 1950s, despite being mischaracterized or discredited by Ptolemaic “epicyclic adjustments”, as Hesse said (Cf. Hesse 1963a, p. 430, cited below).​[14]​ As we saw, Carnap himself insists on the idea that, mutatis mutandis, the positivist project continues the same.  Thus, the enfant terrible continues to be the target of the criticisms and not, we could say, the retired enfant terrible.
After all, as Hanson wrote in 1969, “the spectacular intellectual shock effect of logical positivism derives not from the guarded and sophisticated expositions of the 1960’s but from the strident, stentorian, and sinewy sallies of the twenties and early thirties” (Hanson 1969, p. 84).  Or as in Danto’s expressive description of logical positivism’s verifiability criterion:  
For a time, it stood as a kind of logical scarecrow, frightening away the timid crows of speculation, but bit by bit it withered on its cross. The positivists continued to insist upon it as if it were true and fatal, but finally, except as a stratagem of intimidation, it stopped being interesting. Still, philosophy proceeded as if it were true (Danto 1997, p. 142).
And what to say of the following brief and precise analysis that Mary Hesse inserted in his review of Nagel’s The structure of science? She writes:
The theoretical character of modern science has been a considerable embarrassment to positivist philosophies of science. Various programmes of reduction of theoretical concepts to observational terms consistently failed either to provide a plausible account of the nature of theories, or to provide detailed reduction definitions for any of the important theoretical concepts actually in use in science. But since it was unrealistic to suppose that science would abandon theory, the question arose whether science as universally practised could be accommodated within empiricism as traditionally understood. 
Professor Nagel has written an account of the structure of science which is the most detailed, the most cogent, and perhaps the last, defence of the view that the commonplaces of empirical philosophy since Locke and Hume remain basically unchallenged and unchallengeable by the subsequent growth of science. I say perhaps the last, partly because it is not only philosophers of science who now challenge these commonplaces, but also because to exhibit the whole massive argument, as Nagel here does so brilliantly, is itself to prompt the reflection that it is perhaps time Ptolemy met his Copernicus. The epicyclic adjustments have become too top-heavy for comfort. The subject-matter of science may have increased immensely in complexity, but it is not obvious that the analysis of the structure of science needs to be as complex as the positivist starting-point makes it (Hesse 1963a, pp. 429-430).
Published in 1963, this text is an excellent document of the historical moment that is of interest to us here, and it fits right in with a passage from the review of Structure quoted by Richardson:   
It cannot be disputed that this is the first attempt for a long time to bring historical insights to bear on the philosophers' account of science, and whatever the puzzles that remain to be solved, Kuhn has at least outlined a new epistemological paradigm which promises to resolve some of the crises currently troubling empiricist philosophies of science. Its consequences will be far-reaching (Hesse 1963b, p. 287).
Hesse’s sharp observations are completed with other passages (which Richardson does not quote):  
The whole thesis is, however, sufficiently shocking to the orthodox philosophy of science with its neat distinctions between observation and theory, pragmatic and semantic, psychology and logic, history and philosophy (Hesse 1963b, p. 287).
And also:
This is an important book. It is the kind of book one closes with the feeling that once it has been said, all that has been said is obvious, because the author has assembled from various quarters truisms which previously did not quite fit and exhibited them in a new pattern in terms of which our whole image of science is transformed (Hesse 1963b, p. 286).

To conclude:
A “revisionist history” of the philosophy (of science), in the words of Rorty, which according to him was demanded by the “revolutionary movements within an intellectual discipline”, is what the revisionists appear to have done to logical positivism (Rorty 1982, p. 211. See also Kuhn 1970, pp. ix and 137). 
Revolutionary or not, it is Kuhn’s theory that the revisionists use as their reference in their incursion into the history of the philosophy of science.  From Kuhn’s theory, revisionists take their criteria of selection to orient their reading and reappraisal of Carnap’s work (Cf. Hoyningen-Huene 1992a, p. 489 and Kuhn 1970, pp. 137-138, already cited). 
Even if philosophers seek to align previous theories of the philosophy of science with Kuhn’s theory to justify a choice, Kuhn maintains that if this alignment is not carefully qualified and conscious, the ruptures will become invisible, and it will become increasingly difficult to understand the history of the philosophy of science, and consequently, the very nature of the philosophy of science as a discipline.  
From the revisionist point of view, curiously, Popper also becomes invisible.  He, who is a critic of positivism and an important historical actor in the change, especially after the publication of the English edition of his Logik der forschung in 1959, passes for nothing more than an extra in the history of the philosophy of science as told by the revisionists (Cf.  Kuhn 1977, p. 267, note 2; Kuhn 2000, p. 125 and Callebaut 1993, pp. 39-40).  This in itself is not a precise indicator that the revisionists undervalued Popper’s work.  Perhaps they simply considered him to be yet another who ignored or misunderstood Carnap’s mature work (like Quine, Kuhn, Hempel . . .).​[15]​  But it would not be strange if they did.  After all, considering how Carnap is somehow ‘transformed’ in Kuhn during the revisionist process, one might expect that Popper – who comes, chronologically, between Carnap and Kuhn – would disappear in a magic act. And it is worth noting that Richardson claims that Popper and popperians, unlike logical positivists, “expressed deep disagreement with Kuhn” (Richardson 2007a, pp. 353-354).
Thus, I believe that the revisionists fail to place themselves in the appropriate perspective for understanding the recent philosophical change that took place in the philosophy of science when they censure the historical actors involved in the change for having neglected or misunderstood the work of Carnap and other logical positivists.  They fail to take into account the context of the historical actors, using their own context instead. ​[16]​  In fact, as Kuhn said philosophers do when they deal with history, it appears that the revisionists seek to know “what’s right and wrong – not about what happened – and therefore tending to look at a text and simply pick out the true and the false from a modern point of view, from what they already know” (Kuhn 2000, p. 315).
If the historical evidence is that members of the philosophical community criticized the initial logical positivist project and not a later, supposedly superior version, they must have had good reasons for doing so, and this should be investigated to draw the appropriate conclusions. After all, it is of this rationality imbedded in practice that Kuhn speaks with regard to science and which he proposes making explicit through investigation of the history of science (Cf. Bernstein 1983, pp. 52 ff.; Hoyningen-Huene 1993, pp. 239-245; Hoyningen-Huene 2006, pp. 126-128).  As Barnes said, Kuhn’s entire method “is based upon the assumption that historical agents are reasonable men” (Barnes 1982, p. 13), and it is useful, in principle, in the historiography of science as well as in the historiography of the philosophy of science.
Thus, the revisionists argue that no real dispute ever took place between Carnap and Kuhn, and that the philosophical change in question was characterized by an evolution rather than a revolution in ideas about science.  However, they inadvertently present what is, in fact, a winner´s history, in which the winner is Kuhn.​[17]​ And this appears to make no sense with respect to Kuhn and his role in the philosophy of science in light of his criticism of this type of attitude in the history of science and his reiterated, insistent discourse in favor of a “new historiography”. We could say that Kuhn would be flattered and grateful, but in view of his convictions, would be unable to accept, as his laurels of victory, a new version of the “winner’s history”.
I am not speaking here of the winner’s or Whiggish history as anathema.​[18]​  I merely consider, as I attempted to show, that such a practice does not lead to a good explanation regarding the philosophical change in question. If one neglects or touches up the image of logical positivism that was in the minds of the historical agents, one does not understand the philosophical change in question.  What remains is certainly a logical positivism that can be taken advantage of for Kuhn’s perspective.​[19]​  But logical positivism then becomes like a depreciated ancient monument from which stones are taken to build the new one, soon rendering it unrecognizable. And what one naturally desires from a historiographical work as such is, naturally, that the monument be preserved for its own sake and in all its integrity and authenticity.  
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^1	  See Pinto de Oliveira 2007.
^2	  The expression “postpositivism”, presented as an alternative to anti-positivism, already appears to reflect a revisionist position, with its merely chronological connotation.  In the texts immediately following, Friedman, Earman, and Irzik all refer to postpositivism.  Here I maintain the established expression, with this qualification.  
^3	   In Irzik 2003, the author refers in the sub-title to changes “from logical empiricism to postpositivism”, but the article has neither a historical nor a sociological character. The same occurs with Friedman 2003. Reisch, however, in his most recent work (Reisch 2005 and  2007), as Richardson himself observes, “offers an account of logical empiricism’s decline but does not directly address the question of Kuhn’s role therein”  (Richardson 2007a, p. 358, note 5).
^4	  He recommends this article in Feigl 1969 (p. 24) as reflecting his own criticism of logical positivism.
^5	  See among others passages Carnap 1967 [1928], pp. xvi-xvii and p. 305. Friedman rejects logical positivism “as a naïve version of empiricist foundationalism, according to which all knowledge is to be reduced to an epistemically certain basis in observational reports”. But he admits (unlike Richardson) that that version is compatible with “the ‘development-by-accumulation’ model (in this case, development by accumulation of observable facts) that Kuhn explicitly rejects at the outset” (Friedman 2003, p. 19).
^6	  And Kuhn thinks so not only in retrospect. Among other passages from his early work, see Kuhn 1970 [1962], pp. 77-78, 98, 125ff., 136ff. and also p. x; Kuhn 1977 [1965], p. 267; Kuhn 2000 [1969], pp. 125 and 127.
^7	  Richardson does not appear to consider these texts to be really representative of logical positivism (Cf. Richardson 2007b, p. 313), but the logical positivists themselves recommend Ayer’s collection.  See, for example, Feigl 1969, p. 23, and Carnap 1961, p. xiii.  I also recall that Carnap wrote addendums to his articles especially for the edition.
^8	  The ‘classic’ changes refer to criteria of meaning, but Feigl also speaks, for example about “Carnap's portentous switch from experiential phenomenalism to physicalism” (Cf. Feigl 1980, p. 45). 
^9	  Uebel writes that it is Neurath “who held the most surprises in store for recent students of the Vienna Circle. Neurath most strikingly contradicts the common stereotype of the logical positivists. Far from being merely the organisational motor (the 'big locomotive', as Carnap once called him) of the Circle's internationalization in the Unity of Science movement of the 1930s and 1940s, Neurath has emerged as a philosopher of quite striking originality” (Uebel 1999, p. 252). In Hacohen 1998 (p. 727), the author criticizes the “presentism” of the new interpretations of Neurath’s writings and of the Vienna Circle (and calls attention to Chapter 6 of  Hacohen 2002; see especially pp. 261-275).
^10	  Richardson writes: “Is Kuhn arguing against logical empiricism in the Structure (…)? Well, he is manifestly not arguing against a sophisticated understanding of the mature work of Carnap, for example. He is arguing against an image of something he takes to be logical empiricism, something he read in quasi-popular books (…)” (Richardson 2007a, p. 361). The period referring to Carnap's so-called "mature work" has not yet been well-defined by revisionists (and may have begun as early as the 1930s). The same seems to occur with the nature of logical positivists' works that Richardson opposes to what he calls “popular”, “quasi-popular” or “semipopular” ones.  
^11	  We should take into account that revisionists do not distinct between logical empiricism and logical positivism “throughout this book” (Cf. Richardson & Uebel 2007, p. 1, note 1). According to Feigl, for example, the shift from logical positivism “to logical empiricism involved a welcome and indispensable liberalization of the criterion” of meaning (Feigl 1983, pp. 168-169).  
^12	  See Neurath 1973, p. 208. Feigl complains: “Much more important, how​ever, were my disagreements with the remnants of some of Mach's ideas, and, in general, of the phenomenalistic and the behavioristic reductionism - that is, the narrow verifi​cationism of the Vienna Circle. I had opposed these trends vigorously but unsuccessfully already during most of my Vienna years, especially from 1924 to 1930. Dirty names, such as 'metaphysician' were used to stigmatize me during that period” (Feigl 1983, p. 38).
^13	  According to Richardson, Carnap’s responsibility does not go beyond the complexity of the work itself. (“His work requires a level of technical sophistication to understand”, p. 314). And Quine and Ayer can be held directly responsible for the unintentional ‘defamation’ of Carnap. The same is suggested in Friedman 1999,  p.507, note 3, and Uebel 1996, p.416. 
^14	  So, it is not surprisingly that “logical empiricism was not only not accepted, it was at least at times deeply resisted and even resented, by philosophers in the 1940s and 1950s”, although Richardson emphasizes this fact in order to raise doubt about the idea that “logical empiricism dominated American philosophy or even American philosophy of science in the 1940s and 1950s” (Richardson 2007a, p. 363).
^15	  Carnap himself criticized Popper’s interpretation of his works. By the way, Giere says: “There is a famous (probably unpublished) quote of Carnap in which he said that he had discovered that distance is not a symmetrical relation, because the distance between him and Popper was very small, but apparently the distance between Popper and him was very big” (Callebaut 1993, p. 39).
^16	  The same occurred with the revisionist interpretation of the publication of Structure in Encyclopedia, in which the discovery-justification distinction is not taken into account (see Pinto de Oliveira 2007).
^17	  This does not mean that Kuhn fully replaced the previous conception in the philosophy of science. See Giere 1996, p. 350.
^18	  See Kragh 1987, pp. 104-107.
^19	  Richardson speaks of “Carnapian resources” to solve “Kuhnian problems” (Richardson 2007a, p 368). It is worth noting that, if this is the revisionists’ philosophical project, it not requires a historical justification and is independent of the revisionist historical thesis here under criticism.
^20	  In Reichenbach’s translation: “Truth is allowed only a brief interval of victory between two long periods when it is condemned as paradox or belittled as trivial” (Reichenbach 1970, pp.122-123). In about the same spirit, Bernstein refers to William James and discusses the reception of Kuhn’s Structure (Cf. Bernstein 1983, pp. 51 and 240).
